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INTRODUCTION
The Challenge is developing leaders who can get the most out of the people they lead.
Gen Peter Schoomaker, CSA 1 Recent military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have included most of the U.S.
Army's officer corps. As major combat operations subsided in both campaigns, these officers confronted an increasingly complex environment, with adversaries striking in unexpected ways to leverage their strengths against U.S. Army vulnerabilities. Tactical leaders had to come to grips with concurrent and competing counter-insurgency and nation-building tasks. Adding to the challenge, these leaders found themselves operating alongside allies with unfamiliar faces, languages, and cultures. These challenges required leaders with the capacity to think, decide, and act in an environment permeated by ambiguity and uncertainty; and, most importantly, the challenges called for leaders with the capacity to adapt to this operational environment.
Although it may be impossible to predict future operational environments, it is very likely adversaries will continue to apply asymmetric warfare against the U.S. to attenuate her superiority in conventional warfare.
2 Consequently, it is not only appropriate but also necessary to ask whether U.S. Army direct and organizational level leaders are equipped with the competency to adapt successfully in asymmetric environments. The purpose of this monograph is to answer this question.
Some have adopted the term "adaptive leadership," but the term is not clearly defined in Leadership at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, suggests people naturally adapt to new situations and conditions and, therefore, it is reasonable to expect military leaders likewise will adapt to their operational environment. 4 Webster's dictionary defines adaptive as "capable of, suitable for, or tending toward adaptation," that is, behavioral change of an individual or group in adjustment to new or modified cultural surroundings. In other words, adaptive behavior is the adjustment by which an individual improves his or her condition in relationship to the environment.
Clearly, the enemy is a pivotal factor in the military leader's operational environment and, hence, it follows the enemy is also a primary catalyst that compels military leaders to adapt.
Just as clearly, U.S. Army doctrine and history advise it is not enough to react to one's adversary;
it is much more desirable to anticipate the actions one's adversary will take, and set the conditions necessary to turn those actions into outcomes that achieve one's desired end state.
Moreover, the activities such anticipation may trigger must be accomplished before one's adversary can affect them. Consequently, any operational definition of adaptive leadership must also include the friendly-foe "anticipate-act-react-counteract" dynamics.
For the purpose of this research, the following definition for adaptive leadership will be used: "the capacity to recognize changing patterns in the operational environment and to take proactive steps to maintain the initiative and dictate the terms of the operation."
The research methodology and, hence, the general outline of this paper, follows four steps. First, any study of leadership or leader competency must begin with an examination of existing doctrine. Therefore, the next chapter assesses whether or not current U.S. Army environments, and whether or not this doctrine codifies the competencies direct and organizational level leaders must possess to adapt and lead successfully in these environments. It is already known that the Army has not defined adaptive leadership well. How well has she determined the competencies necessary for her direct and organizational level leaders to adapt effectively in the contemporary operational environment? Since doctrine is forever evolving, this first step also includes a review of ongoing Army initiatives to update the current leadership doctrine.
The second step explores combat in asymmetric environments. This step identifies the key combat dynamics in an asymmetric environment that affect U.S. Army direct and organizational level leaders. This step produces the initial set of components of the adaptive competency.
The third step examines perspectives about adaptive leadership from direct and organizational level leaders who participated in both Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. This research step includes interviews with veterans of these two campaigns from the 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment. The findings are correlated to the initial set of components of the adaptive competency from step two to produce a final set of components of the adaptive competency for U.S. Army direct and organizational level leaders.
The fourth and last step determines whether fault-lines exist between current U.S. Army leadership doctrine and the components of the adaptive competency that step three determined U.S. Army direct and organizational level leaders required to adapt and lead successfully in asymmetric environments. This last step also identifies areas requiring additional research and recommends changes to U.S. Army leadership doctrine and to the leader development and education programs for direct and organizational level leaders. The intent is to provide suggestions that will enhance U.S. Army developmental programs for producing direct and organizational leaders with the competencies to adapt and lead successfully in asymmetric operational environments. While these suggestions are appropriate for inclusion in emerging leadership doctrine, they are also appropriate for use by units for improving their leader development and training programs in the meantime. Among the ACP's purposes is to inform doctrine and, hence, this strategic document is germane to this study. Three elements of the ACP are particularly important since they provide additional clarity regarding the competencies required of future Army leaders. First, is the plan's identification of the Army's core competencies. Second, is its description of the reorganization of combat and institutional units to meet current and projected threats. Third, is its declaration of the Soldier as the centerpiece of Army transformation.
DOCTRINE AND GUIDANCE
The ACP promulgates two Army core competencies: train and equip soldiers and grow leaders; and, provide relevant and ready land power capability to the combatant commanders as 18 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Campaign Plan Presentation Slide 8, Available from www.army.mil/thewayahead/ acp.html, Internet, Accessed on 2 November, 2004.
19 Ibid., Speaker Notes, Slide 2.
part of the Joint Team." 20 The two Army core competencies highlight the need for forces relevant to the challenges posed in the contemporary operational environment (COE) and ready to achieve operational and strategic objectives in the COE. They also make it clear forces will be neither relevant nor ready if leaders are unable to adapt to the asymmetries in their environment.
The second element of the ACP important to this study is the reorganization of combat and institutional units to meet current and projected threats. The Army will build an increased number of modular, standardized units to increase its flexibility and to better meet the needs of combatant commanders. No longer will Divisions be the centerpieces of Army formations, rather
Brigade Combat Teams will become the building blocks in a transformed Army. These smaller self-contained "Units of Action" will be powerful and able to operate across the full spectrum of military operations, including asymmetric operational environments. They will be permanently task organized and require minimal augmentation. Developing direct and organizational level leaders with the competencies to optimize the potential of this future modular force will be vital.
The centerpiece of Army transformation, the Soldier, is the third element of the ACP important to this study. The Army will alter assignment policies to minimize personnel turbulence, and the Soldier's tour will be synchronized with the unit's 36-month operational lifecycle. The goal is to increase unit readiness levels, improve unit cohesion and soldiers' depth and experience, and improve family stability and predictability. Myriad programs will require overhaul to make the objectives of this transformed Army manifest. As examples, schools and promotions will be more difficult to de-conflict, and institutional leader education and developmental opportunities will become increasingly rare during a unit's lifecycle. Clearly, a higher premium than ever before will be placed on the competence of direct and organizational level leaders to inspire, lead, and care for their Soldiers.
The ACP hints at competencies required for its direct and organizational level leaders.
The information age will demand new skills, an inherent flexibility, and, since quantity is less 20 Ibid., Slide 7.
important than quality, versatility. Diversity and adaptability will be integral for transformation as Schoomaker seeks to develop leaders who can find "Opportunities within chaos." 21 To find and exploit these opportunities, the Army will need every Soldier to be a sensor and a leader.
Army leaders must be responsible for what happens in their presence. They must value learning as much as they strive to adapt and maintain the initiative. Teamwork will become increasingly important, as will efforts to find solutions rather than fixing blame. Army leaders will need the skills to "create situations for an adversary, rather than reacting to them."
22
General Schoomaker's plan to develop adaptive leaders emphasizes training for certainty and education to deal with uncertainty. One certainty for leaders and Soldiers alike is that they will deploy, most likely into combat. Since the battlefield is becoming less linear, with front and rear lines blurring, all soldiers must be "warriors first, and specialists second." 23 The ACP should inform leader development doctrine in a major way. Direct and organizational level leaders will now have many of their initial developmental experiences in Units of Action. Additionally, unit commanders will inherit an increased burden for leader development. They will need to rely more heavily upon operational or unit level training since institutional learning experiences will become spaced further apart and possibly shorter in duration. The Report also reveals the fact that much more needs to be done to leverage the Army's human and intellectual capital. It identifies the need to retool leader development and training in a manner that focuses "on gaining and sustaining high levels of experience in technical and cognitive" realms. 29 Importantly, it calls for a gradual transformation from the three pillars of Army leader development, institutional, operational, and self-development to a more balanced, integrated, and progressive model. The shift in Army leader development will make use of globally distributed learning, provide twenty-four hour reach back capability, and make Asymmetries of will are most visible at the strategic and operational levels of war; at the tactical level, this form of asymmetry becomes one of morale. 50 As the levels of war between the strategic, operational and tactical often blur, so too do these two asymmetries. In asymmetries of will, or morale, differences emerge as one antagonist views its vital interests or survival at stake, while the other is protecting less than vital interests. With greater will or morale, an adversary might be willing to accept more risks and costs or even employ methods that might be rejected otherwise. Adversaries may target the morale of U.S. troops attempt to disrupt U.S. led coalitions, and attack the support from the American public. Clearly, Taliban propaganda before Operation ANACONDA sought to diminish the morale of the U.S. infantryman; and in Iraq, attacks on the U.N. headquarters undoubtedly were intended to disrupt international support and diminish U.S. resolve. Direct and organizational leaders must be able to keep their soldiers focused on the mission. In so doing, caution must be employed to prevent the artificial overlaying of U.S. values and morals upon likely adversaries. U.S. Army leaders will need to demonstrate resolve and explain to their Soldiers not only the context of operations but also the importance of their effort. Sample actions to counter asymmetries of will or morale include commitment to Nation, Army, unit, communities and allies. Cultural awareness as well as 50 Metz and Johnson, [10] [11] conveying the significance of the task and purpose of their work also mitigates asymmetries of will or morale.
THE ASYMMETRIC ENVIRONMENT
Asymmetry of organizations is another form of asymmetry found in asymmetric warfare.
U.S. forces may not face adversaries organized in a similar hierarchical fashion. Non-state adversaries with loyalties to tribes, clans or movements may organize as networks, rather than structured formations, increasing the uncertainty associated with the unfamiliar. Identification of the enemy becomes problematic and structures become more flexible and less structured as individuals try to obscure their associations. 51 Indeed, in Afghanistan and after the completion of major combat operations in Iraq, U.S. forces faced unexpected and elusive adversaries with organizations structured in unfamiliar ways. Army leaders will need to ensure they do not imprint their organizational hierarchy onto the adversary. To emphasize asymmetric organizational advantages against adversaries, direct and organizational level leaders will need to build flexibility within their organizations. Combined arms teams will need to be formed and employed at the lowest levels. Engineers, infantrymen, intelligence specialists, translators, special operating forces, and interagency members will need to form teams that can combine their efforts in a synergistic fashion to impose the future upon the adversary. Such organizational flexibility will place a premium on tactical level leaders who make decisions with operational and strategic context in mind. It also mandates situational awareness, understanding the nature and capabilities of the enemy's organization, and mental agility. To exploit the symmetries of organization, leaders must be expert at building teams and processes. They must clearly express intent, and issue orders that focus upon that intent, versus the plan.
Finally, asymmetries of time or patience can be significant. Asymmetries occur in this form when one adversary enters a conflict for a short period while the other views the conflict as a protracted struggle. Congressional and public support for any use of force exclusive of vital 51 Meigs, 7. national interest has a limited life span. 52 The U.S. eschews protracted conflict, yet asymmetric warfare is likely to extend conflict as adversaries labor to make decisive victory increasingly elusive. Direct and organizational level leaders must be patient. The quick solution may not yield decisive results. By accounting for the context of time and advocating patience within and beyond their organization, direct and organizational level leaders can counter asymmetries of time.
The foregoing suggests that, if adaptive leaders are to dictate the parameters for action, they must be equipped with five components of the adaptive competency: 1) They must possess situational awareness. They observe their environment, recognize changes and maintain vigilance for not only threats, but also opportunities.
2) Once recognizing the threats and opportunities extant in their operational environment, adaptive leaders must be intelligent risk takers. Balancing initiative and creativity, intelligent risk takers can find and exploit opportunity in the midst of uncertainty. By sorting through the unfamiliar and uncertain, intelligent risk takers act well before all the information becomes available; they see meaning in unfolding events and are ready to act accordingly. 4) Mental agility enables the adaptive leader to reduce some of the uncertainty associated with asymmetric warfare. Mentally agile leaders are able to filter through the fog, identify that which is important, and prioritize efforts to achieve a desired outcome. They look at problems from different perspectives and continually evaluate the relevance of information and question assumptions. They can make sense of chaos; they translate complex situations, providing meaningful explanations for those they lead. In sum, this study thus far has deduced five components of the adaptive competency.
That is, adaptive leaders are: situationally aware, intelligent risk-takers, know themselves and their adversary, are mentally agile and possess strength of character. Next, these components of the adaptive competency will be correlated with the interviews conducted with veterans of the 505th Parachute Infantry regiment who participated in both OEF and OIF to produce a final set of components of the adaptive competency that U.S. Army direct and organizational level leaders require to lead successfully in asymmetric environments. The authors identify mental agility as a competency for U.S. Army strategic leaders. Mental agility is increasingly important to direct and organizational level leaders as well. 56 Williams, 24.
CASE STUDY-505th PARACHUTE INFANTRY REGIMENT
The 505th "Can you find the opportunity within the chaos? Because you can't organize the chaos of the battlefield," challenges the current Army Chief of Staff. 64 Situationally aware leaders recognize opportunity in the operational environment; and intelligent risk-taking enables adaptive leaders to exploit it. In both OEF and OIF, available intelligence led to the emergence of many missions on short notice. To balance the risk associated with these short-fused missions, commanders emphasized intent, a rapid orders process, and rehearsals. In the words of one OIF commander, "We did OPORDS for every mission we had time for, we did rehearsals for every mission regardless of time. We always reinforced commander's intent for every mission. Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM presented the direct and organizational level leaders of the 505th PIR complex, challenging, and asymmetric operating environments. The leaders were able to adapt and successfully navigate their soldiers through these environments. They displayed situational awareness, took intelligent risks, and knew the capabilities of their units and their adversaries. They exercised mental agility and possessed strength of character in the planning, preparation, and execution of their assigned missions. These leaders displayed each of the five components of the adaptive competency the U.S. Army should codify for its direct and organizational kevel leaders to be successful in asymmetric operating environments. 73 Ibid.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The challenges faced by U.S. Army direct and organizational level leaders in OEF and OIF combined to create an environment permeated by ambiguity and replete with uncertainty.
Diverse and often fleeting adversaries employed methods of asymmetry to further muddle a complex operational environment. U.S. Army direct and organizational level leaders were equipped with the competency to adapt successfully in these asymmetric environments. Now U.S. Army leadership doctrine needs to evolve as well.
Current Army leadership doctrine remains relevant, but must mature to meet the demands of the contemporary operational environment. Army senior leadership, asymmetric threats, and recent experience in OEF and OIF beckon change. Emerging leadership doctrine should include adaptability as a competency consisting of five components. These five components are:
maintain situational awareness, know yourself and the adversary, take intelligent risks, exercise mental agility, and demonstrate strength of character. Doctrine cannot prognosticate the exact nature and form of asymmetric conflict, but it can forecast traits and conceptual knowledge that will empower leaders to maintain the initiative and dictate the parameters for action.
This monograph focused mainly upon determining the components of the adaptive competency. However, several recommendations emerge from the analysis. Future operational environments demand U.S. Army direct and organizational level leaders with the capacity to think, decide, and act in environments permeated by ambiguity and uncertainty. It is no surprise therefore, that General Schoomaker challenges all Army leaders to be capable of finding opportunity amidst chaos. This study affirms his azimuth and urges senior leaders to continue making the development of adaptive leaders their top priority.
This study also confirms current Army leadership doctrine requires revision. Although the concept of leader competencies is rooted in operational and command and control doctrine, FM 22-100, Army Leadership, makes no specific mention of competencies. Currently, the Army's emerging leadership doctrine (FM 6-22) adopts a competency framework; however, the framework does not include adaptability as a competency.
Additionally, this research posited a working definition of adaptive leadership: the capacity to recognize changing patterns in the operational environment and to take proactive steps to maintain the initiative and dictate the terms of the operation. Emerging doctrine must refine the definition of adaptive leadership. One criticism of the research in this monograph is that it is based on anecdotal evidence to determine the components of the adaptive competency. For this reason further research is recommended. The U.S. Army should commission research-based methods to refine the components of the adaptive competency proffered herein.
Finally, even as the new leadership doctrine is being developed, commanders at all levels should strive to develop the components of the adaptive competency in their direct and organizational level leaders by putting these leaders in uncertain and unfamiliar circumstances, and compelling them to think creatively to find opportunities amidst the chaos. framework of competencies, components and sample actions for use by U.S. Army leaders. This framework is adopted in conceptual development of FM 6-22.
